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The relationship between natural resources and conﬂict is well documented, except for wildlife. We dis-
cuss the role that wildlife can play in national and international security interests, including wildlife’s
role in ﬁnancing the activities of belligerent groups and catalyzing social conﬂict. We argue that, similar
to the ﬁndings for other high-value natural resources, wildlife can have a powerful inﬂuence on violent
conﬂicts and security interests, particularly in developing and weak states, where the earth’s biological
resources are disproportionately found. We suggest that recognizing this relationship is important
because it illuminates the gravity of the threat facing several charismatic species. The association also
illuminates a neglected link between wildlife conservation and high-priority security and development
policy concerns. We advocate that documenting and deconstructing the relationship between the wildlife
trade and international crime, armed conﬂict, security, and development concerns within the context of
our knowledge of other high-value natural resources has policy and management implications of great
important in conservation practice.
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The conservation of many of the world’s large, charismatic, and
legally protected species is in crisis for a variety of reasons includ-ing illegal taking and trafﬁcking. The illegal trade in wildlife and its
products has been the subject of an impressive array of interna-
tional conferences, journal articles and conservation programs. As
a result ‘wildlife crime’ is now a buzzword. Despite this attention,
the effective management of these issues is far from clear, and
some components of the phenomenon, such as the ivory trade,
are reportedly escalating rapidly with alarming statistics reported
over the last decade (Gabriel et al., 2012; Gettleman, 2012). While
we acknowledge the ecological, conservation and ethical concerns
L.R. Douglas, K. Alie / Biological Conservation 171 (2014) 270–277 271surrounding wildlife trade, we focus here on a speciﬁc component
of this complex issue, namely the potentially destabilizing inﬂu-
ence that wildlife trade (including legal wildlife-based industries)
poses to national and international peace and security interests.
The relationship between wildlife, social conﬂict, and security is
still inadequately discussed in conservation literature. We advo-
cate for conservationists beneﬁtting from cross-disciplinary stud-
ies about whether and how the wildlife trade contributes to,
beneﬁts from, and may become conjoined with various forms of
social conﬂict beyond the criminality of the taking and trafﬁcking
of wildlife. We thus situate this review in the criminology, terror-
ism, social conﬂict, and sustainable development literatures, and
argue that, similar to the ﬁndings from the analysis of other natural
resources described as ‘‘high-value’’ or as ‘‘conﬂict resources’’,
wildlife can play complex roles in local and international conﬂicts
and issues of national and international security.
Here we:
1. Argue that wildlife are high-value natural resources.
2. Discuss the mechanisms through which wildlife have
become part of conﬂicts in relation to the roles and mecha-
nisms described for other high-value natural resources.
3. Discuss why wildlife may be preferred as ‘‘conﬂict resources’’
relative to several other types of high-value natural resources.
4. Discuss the conservation implications of the non-character-
ization of wildlife as high-value resources.
We begin with an introduction of high-value natural resources.
We brieﬂy review the illegal wildlife trade, and argue that there are
three main pathways that connect wildlife, as high-value natural
resources, to social conﬂict, insecurity, and development concerns.2. High-value natural resources and conﬂict
The development policy and conﬂict literatures highlight the
important inﬂuence of ‘‘high-value’’ natural resources on sustain-
able development, conﬂict, and security at multiple scales (Ross,
2004; Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012). While the physical attributes
of these commodities can vary greatly, high-value natural re-
sources generally refer to those commodities that in their natural
state have the potential to yield substantial revenues (Lujala and
Rustad, 2011). Classic examples are diamonds, oil, natural gas,
gold, uranium, coltan, and several precious gems and minerals.
When well-managed, these valuable resources can be the corner-
stone of economic prosperity, substantially raising living stan-
dards, facilitating socio-economic equality and the reduction of
state dependence on foreign aid (Lujala and Rustad, 2012). Conﬂict
theorists argue that despite the apparent forecast of a more pros-
perous, peaceful future that the presence of high-value resources
suggests, the inverse result is unfortunately common (Le Billon,
2005). This relatively well documented inverse relationship is de-
scribed through a collection of mechanisms, the most notable
being the ‘‘resource curse’’ (or paradox of plenty), ‘‘Dutch disease’’,2
greed and grievance mechanisms, and the ability of high-value nat-
ural resources to encourage corruption and directly ﬁnance armed
uprisings (Le Billon, 2005; Matthew et al., 2009). Thanks to the pop-
ularity of blockbuster ﬁlms such as Blood Diamonds, the Lord of War
and Black November, a diverse cross-section of the public is already
aware of some general aspects of these phenomena.2 An economic phenomenon in which the increased exploitation of one or a few
high-value natural resources produces a decline in the manufacturing and/or
agricultural sectors of a nation. The phenomenon was ﬁrst described from the
Netherlands after the exploitation of large natural gas reserves, discovered in 1959
made other exports uncompetitive, facilitating economic underperformance broadly,
.Despite their ‘‘high-value’’ designation, however, conﬂict and
peace practitioners continue to show that a larger diversity of nat-
ural resources have powerful inﬂuences on security and social un-
rest globally. This list includes opium (Latin America and Asia:
Lujala and Rustad, 2012), palm oil, coffee, rubber, cashew nuts
(Liberia: Matthew et al., 2009); ﬁsh and charcoal (Somalia:
Matthew et al., 2009); rosewood (Madagascar: Jütersonke and
Kartas, 2010); cotton and cocoa (Côte d’Ivoire; Global Witness,
2007); and resin trees (Cambodia: Global Witness, 2002).
‘‘High-value’’ is therefore relative, and primarily determined by a
region’s prevailing socio-economic structure, natural resource
availability, and whether there is either a strong regional or
international demand for the commodity in question.
The mere presence of such high-value resources can become the
focus of violent disputes, and their systematic exploitation and
trade can ‘‘contribute to or result in the commission of serious vio-
lations of human rights or violations amounting to crimes under
international law’’ (Matthew et al., 2009). They may also directly
ﬁnance groups (tribes, ideological driven organizations, nations,
etc.) using crime and violence to advance their interests and causes
(Lujala and Rustad, 2011). Development and conﬂict practitioners
emphasize that natural resources are rarely ever the sole cause
of conﬂict. Nevertheless they frequently encourage it, especially
in regions where there are histories of weak institutions and gov-
ernments, and when there is strong demand (Ross, 2004). For in-
stance, diamonds did not cause the Angolan or Sierra Leone wars
(Grant, 2012). Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) report that from
1970 to 2006 approximately 40% of all interstate conﬂicts were
associated with high-value natural resources. Most modern con-
ﬂicts have occurred within regions where biodiversity is particu-
larly high, with over 80% of all major armed conﬂicts during the
period 1950–2000 occurring directly within areas recognized as
global biodiversity hotspots (Hanson et al., 2009).
That wildlife can be the direct or indirect casualty of civil wars
and social unrest is relatively well documented (Beyers et al.,
2011; Dudley et al., 2002; Shambaugh et al., 2001). Rarely, how-
ever, have studies of poaching, trafﬁcking and illegal wildlife-use
discussed wildlife within the theoretical framework of ‘‘high-
value natural resources.’’ A few writers have used terms such as
‘‘conﬂict ivory’’ (Naylor, 2005) or ‘‘blood ivory’’ (Christy, 2012).
However, in a search using ‘ISI Web of Science’, no journal arti-
cles directly referenced wildlife within the context of high-value
resources. In this online citation search we examined key words,
titles and abstracts over the 20-year period, 1993–2013, for the
terms ‘conﬂict resources’, ‘high-value natural resources’, ‘resource
curse’ or ‘lootable resources’ in relation to terms for ‘wildlife’ and
using the name of several individual animals and their products
(including: lion, elephant, rhino, tiger, snow-leopard, ivory, bush
meat). We also note that a recent authoritative edited volume re-
view of high-value natural resources (Lujala and Rustad, 2012)
does not discuss wildlife as an example of high-value natural
resources.
Not surprisingly, then, local governments and institutions
associated with trafﬁcked fauna continue to frame the issues of
poaching and trade overwhelmingly along a spectrum from local
opportunistic hunting to international crimes. Describing these
issues as ‘‘conservation challenges,’’, ‘‘wildlife management is-
sues’’, and ‘‘wildlife crimes’’ (Warchol, 2004; WWF, 2012)
acknowledges little or no real importance to broader social
development and larger security concerns (Warchol, 2004). Addi-
tionally, conservation biologists have predominantly framed the
issues as driven by the subsistence needs of individuals and
loosely organized local criminal groups. Nevertheless, criminolo-
gists argue that the ‘‘days when poaching were a relatively sim-
ple matter of commoners hunting. . .’’ are ‘‘long past’’ (Lemieux
and Clarke, 2009: 451).
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overview
The international trade in wildlife is worth an estimated $332
billion, based on import declarations for wildlife, ﬁsheries and
wild-sourced timber (Engler, 2008). It is estimated that a propor-
tion of this trade in animals, worth some $10–20 billion annually,
is illegal (Bliss, 2009; Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). Precise ﬁgures
have, however, been challenging to obtain in large part ‘‘because
of the clandestine nature of the trade’’ (Barber-Meyer, 2010). This
illegal component includes the trade in locally common live exotic,
rare and endangered animals, meats, eggs, and various animal
body parts and organs, including bones, horns, tusks, genitals, gall-
bladders, pelts, paws, and ﬁns. Global interest and demand has ri-
sen for both live animals and their products. The ease of
international travel, internet marketing and sale, and rising afﬂu-
ence in regions such as the Middle Eastern Gulf states, India, China
and Eastern Europe has facilitated this rise (Cooper, 2013; Naylor,
2005; Sheffer, 2013).
Trade in wildlife can be particularly proﬁtable in poor nations.
For example, Gettleman (2012) indicates that the tusks of one
adult elephant may be ‘‘worth more than ten times the average
annual income in many African countries.’’ As a result, the popula-
tions of several affected species have declined signiﬁcantly, and
with their decline their demand and market value have soared.
Because global demand for some species exceeds biological capac-
ity, local or total extinctions of some species or sub-species have
resulted (Glew and Hudson, 2007; Naylor, 2005).
Globally the wildlife trade is believed to be surpassed only by
the illegal weapons and drugs markets as important sources of
ﬁnancing for organizations seeking to sustain or ignite conﬂict inTable 1
Retail prices of wildlife and wildlife products.
Species or animal part Uses
Mammals
Lion Trophy
Lion: bones Tiger bone substitute
Orangutans Exotic pet/Tourism entertainment/Disreputable
animals
Rhino: horn Traditional medicine
Tiger: skin/pelt Decorative/Clothing
Snow Leopard: pelt Decorative/Clothing
Elephant: raw ivory Decorative/Various
Polar Bears (Ursus maritimus) Trophy
Cubs of Lions, Hyenas and Leopards Exotic pet for wealth elite of the Gulf states of
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
Pangolins Luxury food item/Traditional medicine
Amphibians
Tokay Gecko (Gekko gecko) Exotic pet/Traditional medicine
Reptiles
Madagascan Plowshare Tortoise
(Astrochelys yniphora)
Exotic pet
Angolan Python (Python anchietae) Exotic pet
Komodo Dragon (Varanus
komodoensis)
Exotic pet
Birds
Lear’s Macaw (Anodorhynchus leari) Exotic pet
Pakistani falcons Sports hunting
Insect
Colophon beetles Decorative display
h = US Government Interagency Working Group, 2000. International crime threat asses
Some sources also indicate that Sun Bears, Musk Deer, Blue Sheep, Burmese Pythons, and
for large sums. However recent published sale prices for these commodities were challemany of the most conﬂict-prone areas of the world, from Chad to
Afghanistan (South and Wyatt, 2011; Warchol, 2004; Wyler and
Sheikh, 2008). Indeed some argue that this now ubiquitous trade
is simultaneously one of the most proﬁtable and attractive of all
the illicit trades (Warchol, 2004). The trade’s attractiveness is lar-
gely due to its relative lack of social stigma, small risk of prosecu-
tion for wildlife crimes, and the light penalties given to those few
brought to justice (Warchol, 2004; Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). A Uni-
ted Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime Regional Ofﬁce (UNODC) for
Southern Africa (2012) report notes that the street value of rhino
horn can exceed the per kilogram price of gold. In general the
whole or parts of several species can fetch astounding prices on
the black market (Table 1). While elephants (ivory) and rhinos
(horns) remain the poster animals of illegal wildlife trade, research
suggests that these species are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of
trafﬁcked wildlife or wildlife products with strong connections to
sophisticated criminal networks, state corruption and conﬂict
(Warchol, 2004; Wasser et al., 2009). For example, according to
Warchol (2004) in Africa and Asia the trade in lesser-known ani-
mals such as pangolins and exotic birds is far greater in scale and
organization than that of large, iconic species like tigers or rhinos
(see also: Challender and Hywood, 2012; Lim et al., 2012).
4. Mechanisms linking wildlife to conﬂict, security and
development concerns
While the relationship between any natural resource and con-
ﬂict is multidimensional and complex, following Matthew et al.
(2009) and Lujala and Rustad (2011) we argue for three main path-
ways connecting wildlife as high-value natural resources to social
conﬂict, among other well documented economic/policy-relatedReported retail price: range or max in
US$
References
$10,000–$50,000 ea. Warchol (2004)
$165 per kilo Hervieu (2013)
zoo exhibit $1000 ea. Stiles et al. (2013)
$30,000–$65,000 per kilo. One horn
sells for up to $250,000
UNODC (2012)
Humphreys and
Smith (2011)
Up to US$20,000 ea. h
Up to US$20,000 ea. h
$6500 per kilo Wasser et al. (2009)
$20,000 ea. Cooper (2013)
Yemen, Saudi Up to $12,700 ea. Sheffer (2013)
Warchol (2004)
Up to $7000 ea. Challender and
Hywood (2012)
Up to $2330 ea. Lim et al. (2012)
$30,000 ea. h
$65,000 ea. h
$30,000 ea. h
$90,000 ea. h
$10,000 to $100,000 ea. Yusufzai (2013)
$15,000 ea. h
sment. US Government.
Cloud Leopards (Baral and Heinen, 2006; Wyler and Sheikh, 2008) are also trafﬁcked
nging to source.
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grievance-based conﬂict, and (c) the undermining of economic per-
formance and environmental governance. Within the latter path-
way we describe three closely related, but separate sub-category
effects of high-value natural resources on: accountability; develop-
ment, economic diversiﬁcation, and exposure to economic shocks;
corruption and environmental policies.
4.1. Resource capture
The capture of valuable resources is a means of securing wealth
and power. Poverty and lack of economic opportunity certainly
drives some wildlife poaching. However, a more ominous dimen-
sion involves highly organized poachers, guerilla insurgent groups,
and state military personnel who use both primitive and sophisti-
cated equipment for the large-scale killing or theft of wildlife re-
sources; the intimidation, capture, and murder of park workers;
and control of wildlife-inhabited landscapes (Revkin, 2012; UN,
2013; Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). Today’s poachers are frequently
equipped with state-of-the-art heat-seeking telescopes, night-vi-
sion goggles, GPS satellite receivers, automatic and semi-automatic
weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and even helicopters and
other military-grade vehicles (Gettleman, 2012). This has in turn
necessitated the militarization of wildlife-protection efforts led
by governments and NGOs to safeguard megafauna (Gettleman,
2012; Humphreys and Smith, 2011). Gun battles between poachers
and wildlife protection ofﬁcers now claim hundreds of lives annu-
ally in Africa alone (Gettleman, 2012; Humphreys and Smith,
2011). Some park agencies now follow a shoot-on-sight policy to
combat the poaching of charismatic species (Humphreys and
Smith, 2011). West et al. (2006), therefore, remark that ‘‘the polic-
ing and funding’’ of wildlife habitat now requires ‘‘continued state
violence.’’ Some further question whether these ‘wildlife wars’
themselves drive state-sponsored violations of human rights or
international humanitarian law (Benjaminsen et al., 2013;
Brockington et al., 2006; West et al., 2006). These scholars question
whether conservation’s ﬁerce urgency has provided a ‘‘free pass’’
for such potential violations (Humphreys and Smith, 2011).
Poachers often associate directly or indirectly with interna-
tional criminal networks that are in turn linked to political organi-
zations that promote violence (Glew and Hudson, 2007; UN, 2013;
Warchol, 2004). For example the Taliban beneﬁts from the lucra-
tive illegal falconry trade in Afghanistan–Pakistan (Fox, 1999).
Wyler and Sheikh (2008: 20) discuss the link between the wildlife
traded by Somali warlords and Indian Islamic extremist groups
loyal to Al Qaeda. In these cases Al Qaeda operatives and support-
ers have proﬁted from the poaching of ivory and rhino horn. During
its ‘‘north–south’’ war, Sudan’s militias, including Darfur’s Janja-
weed, invaded Cameroon, Kenya, and Chad for illegal ivory
(WWF, 2012). Gettleman (2012) and the UN (2013) note that ivory
appears to be the preferred ‘conﬂict resource’ of the notorious
Lord’s Resistance Army rebel’s ongoing guerilla insurgencies led
by the warlord Joseph Kony. Similarly, the multi-billion dollar ille-
gal rhino horn trade has been linked to Congolese, Sudanese, and
Ugandan civil conﬂicts (Karanja, 2012). The 2013 UN report states
that African militias routinely appear to trade elephant ivory for
weapons, and that the links between the wildlife trade and both
criminal and terrorist activities ‘‘constitute a grave menace to sus-
tainable peace and security in central Africa.’’
Others note that in the aftermath of political conﬂicts globally,
armed groups, including states’ security forces, are often ‘‘demobi-
lized but not disarmed and reintegrated’’ into the economy (Le
Billon, 2012). Such well-armed groups may then exploit easily
accessible and high-value resources—such as wildlife—for their
survival. Wyler and Sheikh (2008) note that state troops have even
been ‘‘encouraged to poach ivory in lieu of receiving salaries.’’Naylor (2005) and Humphreys and Smith (2011) report that Apart-
heid South Africa smuggled wildlife products, ‘‘principally ivory
and rhino horns, on a massive scale during its incursions into An-
gola and Namibia’’ as a means of topping up the state treasury and
sustaining its southern Africa military campaigns (Humphreys and
Smith, 2011: p. 129).
National parks may be simultaneously exploited by militia
groups for natural resources ranging from gold, charcoal and gem-
stones to ivory and hippo teeth, while hunting for bush meat sus-
tains forced-laborers and illegal mining camps (Nellemann et al.,
2010; Warchol, 2004).
Wildlife reserves also frequently serve as ideal base camps and
staging areas for insurgency campaigns in war-torn areas of Africa,
Asia and Latin America (Baral and Heinen, 2006; Dunn, 2003), due
not only to their remote ‘‘protected’’ locations but also because of
the diversity of natural resources they contain, including wildlife.
These sites often come to serve as focal points for the exchange
and trade of multiple trafﬁcked commodities such as drugs, guns
and humans (Stiles et al., 2013; West et al., 2006). In these
exchanges wildlife may serve a central role as a form of currency
(Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). Insofar as wildlife commodities become
the basis of trade, and a substitute for cash, the illegal wildlife trade
facilitates money-laundering (Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). Karanja
(2012) also cites examples of the use of wildlife as currency for ter-
rorism and illegitimate militias in east Africa. South and Wyatt
(2011) postulate that such exchanges might be particularly com-
mon among the larger, more established criminal networks that
routinely engage in two or more proﬁt-making illegal activities.
Resource capture fueled by greed may include not only land-
scapes, but also their infrastructure and institutions. For example
in Central Africa gorillas (Gorilla beringei) are economic resources
of national importance (Nellemann et al., 2010) due to the proﬁts
from high-value gorilla tourism programs. Seizing on the economic
value of these lucrative operations, Congolese rebels murdered
wildlife rangers and captured licensed ecotourism operations to
fulﬁll their own economic ends. Similarly in Nepal Maoist rebels
have not only trafﬁcked endangered species such as tigers and
one-horned rhinoceros (Rhinoceros unicornis), but also captured
protected areas and appropriated the receipt of eco-tourism and
trophy-hunting revenues (Baral and Heinen, 2006). Additionally,
international conservation agencies such as the World Wildlife
Fund have also ‘‘had to pay ‘permit’ fees in rebel-controlled areas’’
to continue their operations (Baral and Heinen, 2006: p. 9).
Wildlife resource capture may be particularly lucrative because
it does not depend on expensive methods of extraction compared
to resources such as oil, gas, and most precious metals. These latter
natural resources are difﬁcult to commandeer and transport, mak-
ing them difﬁcult to steal. High-value wildlife and their products,
on the other hand, are relatively attractive as trafﬁcked commodi-
ties due to their relative high value-to-weight ratios, relative ease
of concealment and transport, the difﬁculty in distinguishing be-
tween legal and illegal procurement and point of origin. All these
characteristics make wildlife and their products classic ‘‘lootable
resources,’’ a subset of high-value natural resources particularly
challenging to monitor from a crime-management perspective.
Other natural resources that fall into this category include alluvial
diamonds and gemstones such as rubies (Lujala and Rustad, 2011).
4.2. Grievance-based conﬂict
Greed and the quest for ﬁnancial gain is not the only reason
why wildlife resources may become focal points in conﬂict. High-
value natural resources often become targets because of what they
symbolize, and as a medium around which the ‘‘disenfranchised’’
can vent their feelings in the form of violent acts (including
sabotage, vigilante attacks, and revenge killings) (Douglas and
3 Benjaminsen et al. (2013) contains the following statement attributed to the ﬁrst
Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere: ‘‘I personally am not very interested in animals.
Nevertheless, I am entirely in favor of their survival. I believe that after diamonds and
sisal, wild animals will provide Tanganyika with its greatest source of income.’’
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are a crucial component of many natural resource-based conﬂicts
when parties feel that they have been treated unfairly compared
to their perceived entitlements or prior privileges (Gurr, 1970;
Scott, 1985). Such grievances are particularly likely when there
are deep ethnic or ideological divisions, lack of political rights/
voice, or the perception that the state (or its surrogate, such as a
conservation organization) is illegitimate or biased towards a dis-
liked elite or foreign interest(s). Rebels also commonly attempt
to capture or destroy revenue-generating sources with the inten-
tion of bankrupting the state and/or demanding political/social
change (Baral and Heinen, 2006). Scott (1985) suggests that such
actions may favor covert or non-explicitly enunciated motivations,
which may thus remain obscure, misunderstood, and unreported.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Virunga National Park,
for example, Mai Mai rebels ‘‘slaughtered hundreds of hippopota-
muses to bring international attention to their movement’’
(Wadhams, 2007). These rebels have also threatened to slaughter
highly-endangered gorillas. In Nepal the commodiﬁcation of wild-
life for lucrative ecotourism programs emerged as a potent symbol
of ‘‘outside domination’’, encouraging local sympathy for Maoist
rebels (Seeland, 2000). These activities mirror the wide scale van-
dalism and ‘‘environmental terrorism’’ that has plagued other
high-value natural resources such as oil drills and reﬁneries in
the Niger delta and Iraq (Okpo, 2012). This understanding parallels
Nurse (2013), who states that ‘‘rather than all wildlife offenders
being rational-thinking proﬁt-driven individuals, wildlife crime is
a complex varied phenomenon involving a range of offenders with
different motivations and offending characteristics.’’ Similarly, de
Koning, (2007) argues that greed should not necessarily be consid-
ered the principal motivation for ‘‘Africa’s forest wars’’. This author
remarks that when the narratives and histories of several of Afri-
ca’s high-value natural resource-based civil wars are closely ana-
lyzed strong socio-political grievances surface as underlying
drivers and motives for violent struggles. We recommend that aca-
demics and managers should recognize this characteristic because
of the implications of such grievances to confuse and impede pol-
icies and programs designed to improve compliance, enforcement,
and management of wildlife crimes (de Koning, 2007).
4.3. Undermining economic performance and environmental
governance
Wildlife is an important part of the natural resource base of the
state (Humphreys and Smith, 2011). Like other high-value natural
resources it is possible that wildlife could, therefore, catalyze per-
verse governance incentives and even undermine economic devel-
opment (Halle, 2009). While this characteristic of the resource
curse may not reﬂect direct links to militias or civil wars, scholars
argue that the risk of violent conﬂicts increases if and when natural
resources undermine a nation’s economic performance and the
quality of its institutions (ISD, 2010; Lujala and Rustad, 2011; Ross,
2004). Here we discuss how the phenomenon is reﬂected in the
conservation literature through impacts on accountability; eco-
nomic development and exposure to economic shocks; corruption
and the facilitation of what some describe as ill-conceived wildlife
policies.
4.3.1. Impact on accountability
The potential contribution of legal wildlife industries to both
economic development and conservation is very attractive as, when
well-managed, the returns may not only be substantial for nations
possessing charismatic fauna, but also is arguably more sustainable
than the extraction of most other high-value resources (Much-
apondwa and Stage, 2013). The development of most types of
high-value natural resources require massive land transformationand environmental damage, expensive environmental impact mit-
igation measures, most of which never restore these environments
to their former state. Nature-wildlife tourism is currently the fast-
est growing segment of global tourism, and during times of peace,
rare, endemic and/or large concentrations of charismatic mega-
fauna can be the source of major industries. For example wildlife
is the basis for Kenya’s tourism industry attracting 80% of interna-
tional tourists worth US$400 million annually to the nation’s econ-
omy during the early 1990s (Akama and Kieti, 2003; WTO and
UNEP 1992). Under Kenya’s current development plan – ‘‘Vision
2030’’ – wildlife conservation and tourism expansions are key
‘growth sectors’ that aim to ‘‘making Kenya a middle income coun-
try by the year 2030’’ (Karanja, 2012). Similarly Botswana’s national
development plan ‘‘recognizes wildlife as one of the country’s main
valuable natural resources’’ (Muchapondwa and Stage, 2013) in a
country where ‘‘high-value’’ tourism, overwhelmingly based on
wildlife, is the second largest economic sector (Mbaiwa, 2005).
Tanzania earned US$ 1,250 million from tourism (overwhelmingly
wildlife-based) in 2010 (Benjaminsen et al., 2013).3 The Gorilla
tourismmarket of Rwanda and Uganda is valued at US$ 44.14million
annually (Hugues, 2011). The value of elephant safari experiences in
Kenya was calculated at US$ 23–27 million annually (Brown, 1993).
Several African nations depend on wildlife tourism as ‘‘substantial
revenue earners’’ (Humphreys and Smith, 2011).
The revenues from wildlife tourism not only include non-con-
sumptive forms such as watchable wildlife, but also consumptive
tourism, such as trophy hunting catering to high-end tourists. For
example, hunting alone is worth approximately US$ 70 million
annually for South Africa (Tisdell and Wilson, 2004). Hunters of
exotic game (mainly from Europe and North American) pay as
much as US$ 50,000 to kill individual animals of certain South
African species (Warchol, 2004). In whatever form, important cor-
ollary effects of developing wildlife industries through tourism are
that: (a) such ventures generally provide strong incentives for gov-
ernments to conserve charismatic fauna, while simultaneously
safeguarding the important ecosystem functions and (b) they
encourage state presence. Lack of an effective state presence is of-
ten an important precondition for widespread illegal exploitation
(Blom et al., 2012).
Development practitioners, political scientists and anthropolo-
gists have nonetheless argued that wildlife conservation in wild-
life-rich countries, such as many sub-Saharan African nations,
fails to deliver tangible beneﬁts to the rural masses (Baral and
Heinen, 2006; Ormsby and Kaplin, 2005; West et al., 2006). These
authors argue that wildlife conservation often isolates government
from the interests, needs, and accountability to such communities,
and sets the stage for hostility and long term battles over rural
investment priorities, patronage, how resource revenues are dis-
tributed, and traditional rights. These observations are reminiscent
of concerns at the heart of the ‘paradox of plenty’ disputes about
the effect of diamond and petroleum exploitation on government
accountability in several African and Arabian Gulf states (Courson,
2011; Okpo, 2012). Here while oil revenues ﬁnance governments
‘‘the people from whose land the crude oil is extracted and pro-
duced are forgotten’’ (Okpo, 2012: 15). Similarly, some authors
point out that rural communities shoulder substantial costs of liv-
ing with large crop-eating or predatory animals, and may face dis-
possession of lands while proﬁts go to government, local elites or
foreign investors (Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Douglas and Veríssimo,
2013).
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economic shocks
Strong wildlife industries can also undermine efforts or an
interest in broader diversiﬁcation of local economies in wildlife-
rich landscapes because the pristine landscapes that tourists
demand are incompatible with many forms of development (Butt,
2012). Some argue that these social effects of protected areas
frequently deepen economic inequality and marginalization well
beyond their boundaries. Brockington et al. (2006) and Butt
(2012) argue that wildlife conservation sometimes prevents more
broad-scale agriculture, water and road access, and other develop-
ments that might be more economically meaningful for rural hu-
man populations. This discussion goes beyond the scope of this
paper but is reviewed by several authors (Brockington et al.,
2006; Butt, 2012; Naughton-Treves et al., 2005; West et al.,
2006). Illicit enterprises proﬁting from illegal wildlife markets
may also actively deter economic development and state presence,
as their trade beneﬁts from the lack of broader economic opportu-
nities available to rural populations. Such circumstance can make
rural communities vulnerable or sympathetic to the ﬁnancial sup-
port of poachers and rebels (Gettleman, 2012).
National economies overwhelmingly dependent on wildlife
tourism are also vulnerable because of their dependence on this
ﬁckle industry’s high vulnerability to bad press due to social unrest,
or when tourists stay home because of larger economic forces such
as during the global economic crisis of 2007–2010 (Humphreys and
Smith, 2011; Smeral, 2010). Economic shocks that accompany
abrupt ﬂuctuations in resource revenues can be particularly desta-
bilizing to economies overwhelmingly dependent on one or a few
natural resources. Warchol (2004: 71) notes that uncontrolled
poaching ‘‘represents a serious threat to the economic stability of
any nation that relies on these resources as sources of income for
development.’’ This author further states that ‘‘while attention is
being paid to the detrimental effects of the trade in ‘conﬂict dia-
monds’ in nations such as Sierra Leone and Angola, little attention
is given to the illegal trade endangered species and the resulting
economic impact’’ on these African nations. As with other forms
of high-value illicit trade, the violence (or threat of violence) sur-
rounding poaching and the ‘‘wildlife-wars’’ also undermine other
legitimate economic activities by contributing to a perception of
regional insecurity (Bliss, 2009). The crime and violence associated
with the illegal wildlife trade can, therefore, undermine govern-
ments, economic development and stability broadly (Humphreys
and Smith, 2011).
4.3.3. Impact on corruption & Ill-conceived environmental policies
Economic under-performance and poor governance make the
resource-wealth of many developing countries vulnerable to
patronage and corruption. Lemieux and Clarke (2009) showed
empirically that the illegal taking of elephant ivory and state
corruption are correlated. Similarly, corruption undermines envi-
ronmental governance and permits a wide range of poor conserva-
tion policies and practices to develop and persist (Gettleman, 2012;
Lemieux and Clarke, 2009; Naylor, 2005; Warchol, 2004). These
authors note that where corruption is highest trafﬁcking is perva-
sive, including networks that stretch into the military, police,
border guards, judiciary, customs ofﬁcials, embassy staff, and state
diplomats, all of whom actively facilitate trafﬁcking. For these rea-
sons progressive local and international conservation policies may
be blocked directly or indirectly through, for example, intimidation
or the buying of votes (Kakabadse, 2011).
High-value natural resources may also encourage short term
exploitation/gains of resources including ill-conceived environ-
mental policies. For example, several southern African nations with
stock piles of ivory—worth millions in revenue—pressured the
member states of CITES to legalize its sale (Gabriel et al., 2012;Vandegrift, 2013). Authors argue that legalizing sales, beginning
in 1999 and expanded in 2008, precipitated an escalation in the
global demand for ivory that encouraged widespread poaching
and the ongoing global decline in wild elephant populations (US
Government Interagency Working Group, 2000; Vandegrift,
2013). By extension, these authors suggest that the proﬁtability
of ivory for these national governments owning stockpiles has
encouraged ill-conceived environmental policies that have under-
mined elephant conservation internationally (Lemieux and Clarke,
2009; Naylor, 2005).
While several authors suggest that such corruption is wide-
spread and ‘‘impedes the conduct of legitimate business and weak-
ens national economies’’ (Christy, 2012; Kakabadse, 2011), they
also note that issues of governance and corruption are seldom
studied in detail and reported on in the academic literature. This
appears particularly true of wildlife and their conservation (Naylor,
2005; Warchol, 2004). A more thorough and integrative treatment
of the subject of corruption in wildlife conservation is, therefore,
challenging.5. Conclusions
A large body of work exists within the political development
and conﬂict literatures that discuss the multiple reasons for the
relationship between a diversity of commodities designated
‘‘high-value’’ and issues of conﬂict. Overall, there is broad consen-
sus that natural resource wealth can catalyze social conﬂict, among
other related unintended consequences, and by so doing create
barriers to progressive policies, security, and peace (Wennmann,
2012). There is a striking dearth of debate and empirical research
within conservation science as to where wildlife resources may
also play similar roles. We illustrated howwildlife can become part
of conﬂict, security and social development dynamics through di-
verse mechanisms important to understand and manage both the
legal and illegal wildlife trades. We encourage conservation practi-
tioners to consider and investigate the evidence outlined here
through studies that can further identify and disentangle the
mechanisms through which wildlife acts as high-value natural
resources.
We encourage collaboration with the sustainable development,
the military, and global intelligence communities on projects seek-
ing to ﬁnd solutions to the negative relationships between wildlife
and conﬂict. Already there has been a move in this direction, when
in November of 2009 the CITES secretariat joined forces with the
World Bank, the UN ofﬁce of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World
Customs Organization and INTERPOL to form the International
Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crimes (ICCWC) (Kakabadse,
2011). We encourage ICCWC to include a focus on wildlife as
high-value natural resources. As Kakabadse (2011: 126) points
out, the conservation community must further engage with other
disciplines involved in the struggle against corruption, patronage,
crime and conﬂict more strategically to identify intelligence, criti-
cal knowledge, research, theoretical and technological advances
that can support more effective wildlife conservation even in coun-
tries where corruption remains pervasive. Lemieux and Clark
(2009: 464) further suggest that there are important knowledge
gaps that criminologists may help to close, such as improving con-
servation’s understanding about the diversity of poachers and traf-
ﬁckers including their motivations and methods.
By all indications the demand for live animals and their prod-
ucts will most likely remain high in the short term. This is partic-
ularly true for rare and endangered species, whose very rarity fuels
demand. As demand increases the potential for over-exploitation
and conﬂict dynamics intensify. With over-exploitation the likeli-
hood of substitute commodities targeting other rare or charismatic
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sought as a substitute for tiger bones used in traditional Asian
medicines as the latter species disappears (Hervieu, 2013).
We believe that to ignore the numerous ways in which wildlife
act as high-value natural resources is also to ignore important
questions about still poorly understood incentives and disincen-
tives that fuel the threats that some of the earth’s most iconic spe-
cies face. It also leaves unanswered difﬁcult questions about how
these threats are currently managed and how management could
be improved (Nurse, 2013). By not recognizing wildlife as high-
value natural resources, conservation practitioners also uninten-
tionally marginalize wildlife conservation in the development,
security and peace discourses, thereby giving credence to the false
conservation versus development paradigm. We encourage conser-
vation practitioners to highlight the high-value resource nature of
wildlife, where appropriate, because it is development, security
interests, and politics that dictate most high level decisions that
affect conservation. These conclaves are likely to understand and
prioritize this framing of wildlife more highly than the largely
ecological frames that the conservation policy discourses has tradi-
tionally followed.
Policy and management interventions could beneﬁt signiﬁ-
cantly from such framing. A case study of the Kimberly Process,
the innovative certiﬁcation scheme for the diamond market, shows
how this could possibly work (Hauﬂer, 2009). Various organiza-
tions effectively used awareness campaigns to link the sale of dia-
monds to the horriﬁc civil conﬂicts of Sierra Leon and Angola
giving ‘‘conﬂict diamonds’’ international prominence. In three
years this promoted the UN Security Council to act and develop a
global Certiﬁcation of Origin scheme. Authors note that this inter-
est in regulating conﬂict diamonds was in large part the result of
the intense awareness-raising campaigns that illuminated the
‘‘stark contrast between the symbol of love and glamor promoted
by the (diamond) industry and the grim reality of amputee chil-
dren in Sierra Leone.’’ (Le Billon, 2005). Similar opportunities exist
for wildlife conservation. For example, ivory, like diamonds, is a
luxury item that derives cultural value linked to its prestige in pub-
lic display. A focus on end-users could have a signiﬁcant impact on
either a ban its trade completely, or at least focus international
attention on building critical regulatory schemes. Researchers
suggest that such an approach can be highly effective if ordinary
end-user’s/consumer’s reaction to the dark side of the ivory trade
signiﬁcantly threatens the market. While the trade in ivory appears
to be already stigmatized in many western cultures, public surveys
show that seven in ten Chinese nationals erroneously believed that
the ivory available in China was derived from elephants who died
of natural causes, or that the elephants shed their tusks naturally
(Christy, 2012; Gabriel et al., 2012). Such misunderstandings are
further compounded by the fact the CITES-approved ivory China
purchases legally ‘‘created much confusion among consumers’’
(Gabriel et al., 2012), many now believing ‘‘that the international
(legal) trade in ivory has been resumed’’ (Christy, 2012). In many
cases for wildlife as high-value resources, however, there will be
little or no opportunity for regulating legal markets. We argue that
even here we should continue to follow the policy discourses of Le
Billon (2005, 2012) and Lujala and Rustad (2012), who continue to
investigate a diversity of both domestic and international ap-
proaches for mitigating against the negative effects of high-value
natural resource presence and exploitation.Acknowledgements
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